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[Abstract] Since 9/11, the terrorist is often awarded the position of the radical Other of Danish 
identity; the personiﬁed existential threat to Denmark (not primarily as a state but as a soci-
ety). The strategy of the Danish government to counter terrorism describes itself as covering 
a ‘broad spectrum’ of efforts. It includes an ‘active foreign policy’ in relation to the Muslim 
world and an ‘active integration policy’ in relation to Muslim migrants. Both inside and outside 
the nation state efforts range from ‘hard power’ security strategies of elimination and control 
involving military, police, and intelligence operations to ‘soft power’ strategies of informa-
tion, partnerships, and dialogue. The paper analyses Danish counterterrorism policies to iden-
tify the concepts of dialogue implied and the positions awarded to less-than-radical Muslim 
Others. The paper concludes that Muslims might in counterterrorism dialogue ﬁnd a position 
for talking back – even if it is still a position circumscribed by control and securitization. 

1. Introduction1 
On September 11 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked 4 planes in the USA. Thousands of innocent human be-
ings were killed, and ever since, the world has not been the same. During the last 5 years it has be-
come clear that we are in the middle of a global value struggle. It is not a value struggle between cul-
tures or religions; it is a value struggle between sensible enlightenment and fundamentalist darkening, 
between democracy and dictatorship, between freedom and tyranny. In this struggle, one cannot re-
main neutral... The strongest force in this struggle is the desire and demand of millions of oppressed 
people for freedom. We saw that in Iraq when 12 million Iraqis defied the terrorists and went to the 
ballots ... We have to help Africa so that young Africans see a hope, see a future, see rich possibilities 
in their own country, so that they are not attracted to extremism, so that they do not end up on the 
wrong side of the global value struggle. The global value struggle takes place in Denmark too. .. For-
tunately it is so that the great majority of Danes with an immigrant background ... are contributing 
positively to the Danish society. But there are also a few extremists who seem to hate the society which 
have secured their political freedom and material safety. ...We do not demand that everyone has to be 
alike or be of the same opinion – we want a society with freedom to diversity – but we must demand re-
spect for the very fundamental rules of the game in the Danish society ... We must not out of naïve and 
happy-go-lucky tolerance show understanding towards or facilitate [give medløb til] religious fanati-
cism or political extremism. (prime minister A.F. Rasmussen, lib., R1, 2006.10.03 12.05-12.15). 
In these sentences featured prominently in his 2006 ‘state of the realm’ speech, the Dan-
ish prime minister summarized what the government took to be the conditions for the 
long term counterterrorism strategy of the Danish government: Most Muslims are waiting 
to be our partners in emancipating both themselves and us from extremists threatening us 
and oppressing them. Terms like ‘partnership’ and ‘dialogue’ as part of the self-
description of specific government strategies were generally describing a one way street: 
We have something that the Muslims need (and most of them want); partnerships and 
dialogues were means to implement this already defined goal. 
The main tenet of the opposition to this picture of the world was that Denmark was 
placed in danger by acting self-sufficient: 
Denmark was – because of a lack of dialogue – related to religious intolerance and discrimination 
of minorities due to all the circumstances of the Mohammed [Cartoons] crisis. (MP Kofod, 
soc.dem., F45, 17:05; cf. 16:50). 
This paper analyses how the use of the term ‘dialogue’ in government policies on coun-
terterrorism have gradually changed to include more instances of two-way interaction. 
While the tendency of giving weight to strategies of dialogue in government policies sur-
faced first in foreign policy formulations, it has recently been taken further in an integra-
tion policy document. If the tendency survives parliamentary politics, the most unlikely 
result of the merger of counterterrorism strategies and integration strategies will not be an 
intensified securitization of integration policy but a relative de-securitization of counter-
terrorism. It will, however, not amount to an a-securitization of neither. 
The sections 2 and 3 establishes the paper’s concept of identity by relating the theoretical 
concepts of philosophical and sociological others and by laying out how authorities for-
                                                 
1 I am grateful to the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) for facilitating the research pre-
sented in this paper by hosting me as a guest researcher. A revised version of the paper (to be included in 
my ph.d. dissertation) will have benefited from comments at presentations to the 'Consortium on Research 
in Terror' at NUPI as well as to the Security Programme at the International Peace Research Institute in 
Oslo (PRIO) and the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo. 
 5
mulating strategies for handling the radically threatening terrorist Other may implicate 
less-than-radical others. Section 4 examines how strategies of partnership and dialogue 
involving less-than-radical others have been invoked in counterterrorism as a supplement 
to strategies of elimination and control. Sections 0, 6 and 7 examines how the term ‘dia-
logue’ may – when used in counterterrorism policies – imply either monologue, inclu-
sion, or interchange between two different entities. Section 8 analyses how a concept of 
dialogue as a two-way interchange spurs the need for control and monitoring the limits to 
the difference of the party invited into dialogue. Section 9 lays out how the need to con-
trol and monitor the limits to the difference comes from the efforts of the government to 
position itself as defenders of Danish identity between an opposition calling for Self-
reform and a supporting right wing party putting the possibility of reforming the Muslim 
other in question. Section 10 concludes by evaluating the strategic situation for Muslims 
wanting to revise the script for the role as less-than-radical others they are awarded by the 
counterterrorism and integration policies. 
 
2. The Terrorist as Radical Other and the Responsibility of Government 
Identity needs difference to be; you cannot deem someone identical without deeming 
someone else – some others – different. As long as everyone agrees on who’s identical 
and who’s different – who are included as We; who are excluded as this kind of They and 
as that kind of They – and everyone agrees that that’s the way things should be; no prob-
lem. Problems arise when not everyone agrees. Everyone never does.  
The problem with disagreement is that the allocation of various others in boxes does not 
merely affect Them. As our identity is constituted in relation to their difference, redefini-
tion of others affects our identity too.  
In philosophical terms, a radical Other is that which prevents you from being the one you 
ought to be. Philosophically speaking there is always another other – even another radical 
Other – since identity as a concept implies that any change, any difference, any impurity 
can be pointed out as a threat to identity.  
And threats to identity will be pointed out. If no one names an identity, it is meaningless 
to conceive of its existence. So identity exists only in discourse; only as part of the con-
struction of meaning. But why explicate identity if it is unproblematic? If an identity is 
not explicitly problematic, it does not exist – and the moment it is brought into existence, 
it is necessarily made a problem (Wæver 1997:328-9; Žižek 1992:197; Derrida 1982).  
Further: The radical Other – that which threatens and submerges discourse – urges an ex-
planation; it is there to be discursivized and, hence, domesticated. If a specific group of 
people – a sociological other – is pointed out as that which prevents you from being the 
one you ought to be, that other is radicalized. Another way to put it is that the other is se-
curitized; i.e. pointed out as a security threat: The other is no just said to be different from 
you but said to constitute an existential threat to your identity (Connolly 1991:8, 64). 
In Danish parliamentarian debates, one such sociological other securitized to be a Radical 
Other is ‘the terrorist’. Terrorists, terrorism, and terrorist acts are repeatedly explicitly 
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pointed out as a threat to Denmark, Danes, and key elements in Danish identity;2 they are 
characterized by a variety of invectives;3 and they are routinely dismissed and con-
demned as an introit to the interventions of each party spokesman.4 Indeed, the govern-
ment point out terror as the threat defining our security: 
The threats of the 21st century are fundamentally different than the ones we faced during the Cold 
War and in the first years after the fall of the Wall. The nightmare is no longer an all-destructive 
[altødelæggende] nuclear war but massively destructive attacks from global terror networks or 
desperate regimes which have placed themselves outside the international community. Terrorism 
today is a real and essential threat to populations everywhere in the world. (Regeringen 2003:2) 
Existential threats you need to handle if you are in charge (or want to be put in charge) – 
at least if the referent-object against which the threat is posed is worth defending (Wæver 
1995). If you are in government (or in politics, in which case you want to be in govern-
ment), you will want to be able to stay in authority – and to do so, you need to tell how 
you want to fight off existential threats against the entity you represent. You need to tell a 
plausible story about your choice of strategy.  
In Denmark, the immediate reactions in 2001-2 to the 9/11 attacks on New York and 
Washington focused on ‘fighting the terrorists’. This involves strategies of control and 
elimination. Domestically strategies of controlling the possible activities of terrorists in-
cluded the intelligence services being allowed a series of new operational modes. The 
strategy of physically eliminating terrorists was primarily employed abroad by joining the 
US efforts in Afghanistan. As strategies for dealing with others, both have long traditions 
(Todorov 1984:132-45; Lindqvist 1992; Foucault 1978). 
‘In this struggle, one cannot remain neutral’, claimed the prime minister (cf. quote 
above). Only seldom, however, the stories can be told as a one-on-one showdown be-
tween you and the Evil Other. And even if a story may be based on an allocation of roles 
between the two possibilities of ‘Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’, 
most often a more sophisticated distribution of roles is needed (cf. Hansen 2006:40). 
Generally, for such stories, you need a cast of characters – a cast of less-than-radical Oth-
ers (Hansen 1998). Different strategies invite different less-than-radical Others to partici-
pate.  
                                                 
2 ‘[T]errorism is a threat to society, to the values it is build upon, and to the individual citizen’ (Min. f. Jus-
tice Espersen, con., L217). ‘The terrorists we know today want to fight democracy and the rule of law.’ 
(MP Barfod, con., F7, 18.20). 
3 ‘The threat No. 1 of the future’ (MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 12:10); ‘abominable’ (MP Poulsen, lib., AD14, 
12:10, MP Jensen, soc.dem., AD14, 12:10; MP Messerschmidt, DPP, F1, 16:25; 17:00); ‘brutal’ (MP Poul-
sen, lib., AD14, 12:10); ‘evil’ (MP Jensen, soc.dem., AD14, 12:10); ‘bestial’ (MP Behnke, con., F7, 17.25-
30); ‘insane’ (MP Behnke, con., F7, 17.25-30); ‘crazy’ (MP Barfod, UL, F7, 18:20). 
4 ‘Nothing may, after all, apologize or legitimize terror’ (MP Baastrup, soc., F7, 18:10) and ‘Terror is al-
ways an indefensible act and an act that always needs to be condemned.’ (MP Hoydal, Faroes, F7, 18.30). 
Even as a prelude to arguing a relatively de-radicalized picture of terrorism: ‘The Red/Green Alliance 
wants a world without war and terrorism. Any decent human being condemns terrorism.’ (MP Arbo-Bæhr, 
UL, F7, 17:35).  
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3. Counterterrorism Strategies Constructing Less-than-radical Others 
As time has passed, bringing new events in the Middle East and European capitals, the 
spectrum of Danish counterterrorism strategies have broadened – and the construction of 
different less-than-radical others needed to take up their roles in an evermore ‘broad 
spectrum’ (Ministeriet 2008:29; cf. Pedersen 2008:xx) of counterterrorism strategy narra-
tives have become more complicated.  
In 2005, in a debate in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombing of the London underground, the 
Danish prime minister explained that  
The overall strategy of the government ... involves three parts: We have to prevent support and re-
cruitment for terrorism through our international involvement and through an active integration 
policy at home; we have to fight terrorists and terror networks and cut off their access to money 
and materials; and then we have to prepare ourselves for the fact that a terrorist attack may take 
place (prime minister A.F. Rasmussen, F7, 2005.11.16, 15:15; cf. Regeringen 2003:13)  
It is clear from the interventions of the prime minister and his ministers in the debate that 
strategies of elimination and control are still central: domestically, the Minister for Jus-
tice presents a new catalogue of ‘necessary means for fighting terrorists and terror net-
works’ (ibid., 15:20). But the relative weight of the spectrum – not least in the foreign 
policy part – is tilted towards ‘long term’ (ibid., 15:15) strategies involving less-than-
radical others: ‘Through our active foreign policy we seek to counter the circumstances 
out there, in the World, which may provide a breeding ground for support for terrorism.’ 
(ibid., 15:15; italics added). Abroad the measures include foreign aid (to prevent terrorists 
from legitimizing their deeds by reference to global injustices) and ‘peace keeping opera-
tions’ like ‘the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan’ aiming ‘to integrate them 
in the international cooperation, including the cooperation to fight terrorism.’ (ibid.). In 
parallel, at home ‘We have to prevent young people from being attracted to the ideology 
of extremists’ (ibid., 15:20). 
The others in focus for these counterterrorism strategies are less-than-radical. But these 
others are, nevertheless, others. It might be possible for them to be included in some We 
– but it is not a sure thing, and it is an open question what kind of We they may be in-
cluded in. The less-than-radical others are relatively de-securitized in comparison to the 
highly securitized radical Other – but they are not a-securitized (Wæver 1998); they are 
still discursively inscribed in a security problem: We need a strategy towards Them, to 
make sure that They do not somehow end up as radically other; end up as part of the ex-
istential threat to our identity. We need to reconstruct their subjectivity – to re-form their 
identity and their propensity for action – to have them on our side. 
There is a long history of European and Western attempts to have others reformed – most 
prominently to resemble the model, i.e. the reformer (cf. Todorov 1984). Depending on 
what sort of diacriticon is the threshold for identification the strategies can be identified 
as conversion (religion), enlightenment (knowledge), or modernization (mode of produc-
tion). What holds these strategies of reformation together is that We have a certain char-
acteristicon which We believe They should have as well. Sometimes some of Them agree 
– sometimes They do not. Which warrant more or less coercive means to implement the 
strategy.  
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If They are constructed as split between, on the one hand, the masses which agree to have 
a need to be more like us and, on the other hand, a group of oppressors (the radical other 
of the masses) who does not (cf. Hansen 2006:114),5 a strategy of reform can be termed 
as one of emancipation (cf. Laclau 1996; 2005):  
We have to take on our shoulders the responsibility to help and secure that also the Iraqi popula-
tion will have a democratic and free country to live in. (MP Behnke, con., F7, 2005.11.16 17:40; 
cf. prime minister A.F. Rasmussen, lib., R1, 2003.10.07 12:30). 
Strategies of elimination, control and reformation are effectively one-way affairs: You do 
something to Them; Their possible actions are only conceptualized as counter-active re-
actions to be dealt with accordingly. When it comes to strategies of emancipation, how-
ever, there are limits to what kind of action of the other may be discounted in this way. 
Hence the need arises to engage these less-than-radical others in partnerships and in dia-
logue to secure that their action benefits the common goal of their emancipation.  
 
4. Why partnerships and dialogue? 
Strategies of elimination and control are, as described in the previous sections, supple-
mented by strategies of reform and of emancipation. Strategies of emancipation are, how-
ever, more convincing if an other can be constructed to actively participate in its own 
emancipation. If so, strategies of emancipation may turn into strategies of partnership. 
Andersen concludes a study of partnerships as second-order contracts between the state 
and non-state entities – including partnerships between 1st and 3rd world NGO’s as part 
of state orchestrated development aid (2008:42ff) – by describing the complex relation 
between freedom and obligation constructed:  
What partnerships seek to establish is ... the partner’s freedom to commit to assuming responsibil-
ity for the partnership. Partnerships represent an attempt to formulate mutual obligations concern-
ing the self-creation of individual partners as responsible for and relevant to the partnership. It 
concerns the obligation to create yourself as a free and independent partner for the partnership – 
obligation towards the freedom in the image of the partnership. ... [I]t requires freedom reintro-
duced as obligation, but at the same time it has to presuppose freedom since otherwise there could 
be no obligation towards freedom. (Andersen 2008:106). 
As time passes and the immediately chosen strategies of elimination and control have 
been sought implemented without any determinate success, strategies of partnership are 
featured more and more prominently in the communication of the Danish government. 
In the post-7/7 debate in late 2005, the prime minister talked about two relationships in 
terms of partnerships; one abroad and one at home: As part of the active foreign policy 
we have, by The Arab Initiative6 begun an important dialogue with the Arab countries and Iran. 
The Initiative supports local reform aiming at more free and democratic societies – a development 
which the government finds to be decisive in the prevention of further radicalization. (prime minis-
ter A.F. Rasmussen, lib.,F7, 2005.11.16, 15:15). 
                                                 
5 Hansen’s concept of a ‘split subject’ does not seem to be related to the Lacanian/Kristevan concept simi-
larly termed. 
6 The official English translation of what is in Denmark literally presented as The Arab Initiative is ‘Part-
nership for Progress and Reform’ between Denmark, the Middle East, and North Africa. 
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Domestically, the contribution to counterterrorism from the active integration policy 
builds on the premise that  
Danish Muslims and immigrants in Denmark are decisive allies in the fight against terrorism. To-
gether we can win this fight. We shall prevent young people from being attracted to the ideology 
of the extremists – and that requires us to promote dialogue and counter radicalization in certain 
Muslim quarters. (Ibid., 15:20).  
Partnerships as a counterterrorism strategy generally presuppose a common goal; a goal 
defined by the party articulating the partnership – either because the initiator explicates 
the goal which the partner has to agree to aim for, or because the initiator embody a qual-
ity which the partner by entering the partnership aims at acquiring. The bulk of the spe-
cific sub-strategies included in these strategies of partnership, hence, remain within the 
basically asymmetrical logic of reform. The term ‘dialogue’ when used as a label for a 
substrategy of partnerships does, however, sometimes – though not always – imply a less 
lopsided relation between self and other. 
The Arab Initiative was originally conceived of in 2003 as a part of a comprehensive for-
eign policy document7 but was only effectively launched to the public in 20058 and 
evaluated and adjusted in 20069 in the aftermath of the Cartoon Crisis. The parliament 
debated the initiative and the evaluation on 24 May 2006.10 The evaluation, the adjust-
ment and the debates resulted in slightly more weight to strategies of two-way dialogue. 
The domestic strategies of partnership and dialogue were slower to evolve. The coupling 
– in government policies at least – of counterterrorism strategies and general policies of 
integration of migrants was only cemented after the 7/7 London bombings had propelled 
the concept of ‘home grown terrorists’ into the debate in 2005. Until then the government 
had primarily sponsored a classical economically Liberal concept of integration focusing 
on labor market integration and including some attentiveness to grievances like discrimi-
nation. The immediate reaction to 7/7 – soon joined by the Cartoon affair – was to sup-
plement the labor market efforts with a more culturalist concept of integration bordering 
on cultural assimilation through a focus on a steadily growing list of ‘values’ fundamen-
tal to Danish society (Gad 2008a11). Recently, however, a government policy paper de-
parting in counterterrorism considerations has suggested a partial shift to strategies of 
dialogue in integration policy.  
                                                 
7 Regeringen 2003. Subsequent references will be in the form: (2003:pagenumber).  
8 Parallel texts in Udenrigsministeriet 2005 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005. Subsequent references 
will be in the form: (2005:pagenumber).  
9 Udenrigsministeriet 2006. Subsequent references will be in the form: (2006:pagenumber). 
10 Folketinget, plenary negotiations 24 May 2006, 1st reading of F45 (Debate on The Arabic Initiative 
[Partnership for Progress and Reform]). Subsequent references will be in the form (title name, party affilia-
tion, F45, hh:mm). References to other parliamentary negotiations will follow the same form; for details 
consult the references section. 
11 A more detailed analysis is in preparation as Gad 2008b; cf. Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og 
Integration 2007; and the plenary negotiations of Folketinget on 26 April 2007, 1st reading of F37. 
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Two reasons for applying strategies of partnership and dialogue are presented in this gov-
ernment policy paper on counterterrorism named ‘A common and safe future – suggested 
action plan on prevention of extremist attitudes and radicalization amongst the young’:12 
The first reason is that if We – Denmark – shall be able to successfully communicate to 
potentially radicalized Muslims (in Denmark and in the Middle East), we need partners. 
We need non-radicalized Muslims to communicate to potentially-radicalized Muslims 
since  
[w]hen it concerns working on the opinions and norms of a person who is not yet quite settled in 
questions of identity – or who is already marked by rooted extremist ways of thinking – the dia-
logue taking place face to face is key. (2008:30).  
Abroad ‘there might be a need for an increased involvement of the Danish resource base 
with roots in these regions in the international engagement of Denmark’ (2008:10), hence  
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will send out an Arabic speaking staff member to one of the embas-
sies in the Arab world who will, i.a., be assigned with securing the contact to Arab media ... and 
securing the communication of positive stories about Denmark to the Arab/Muslim world. 
(2008:37). 
Domestically, there is a need for hooking up with partners enjoying Muslim authority: 
‘Representatives for Muslim local circles in Denmark, enjoying social status ... are able 
to influence in the local circles where they move’ (2008:34) and, hence, a  
well organized and democratically based leadership in the individual religious community has ... 
the potential to reach large proportions of the religious sectors. (2008:39).  
But there is also a need for imbuing state authority with Muslim authority by teaming up 
with Muslim employees:  
Yet another element that may contribute to increasing the contact and trust between the police and 
the citizens of pluricultural background is ... the recruitment of applicants to the police of other 
ethnic background than Danish (2008: 39);  
and ‘Teachers with a multicultural background will be able to work as role models for 
children and youth with a similar background’ (2008:44). Since the ethnically Danish 
Denmark cannot reach these target groups by itself, a partnership with someone more 
alike these potentially radicalized Muslims is needed. 
The second reason for choosing a strategy of dialogue is that exclusion (also in the form 
of perceived exclusion and self-exclusion) is ‘a threat to the cohesive power’ of the Dan-
ish society (2008:10, cf. pp. 11f). As the popularized presentation of the action plan to 
counter radicalization explains: ‘The danger occurs when the reality which young people 
experience comes to look like the message which the Islamists want to sell.’ (Nyidan-
mark 2008(2):10). Hence,  
[our t]hrowing suspicion on ethnic and religious groups can be utilized actively in the propa-
ganda we see from the ones opposed to a plural, democratic society. For this reason too it is im-
portant that suspicion of being part of the problem is not thrown on anyone able to contribute to 
the solution. (2008:13) 
                                                 
12 Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration 2008. Subsequent references will be in the form: 
(2008:pagenumber).  
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So we need to affirmatively include Muslims to avoid their self-radicalizing exclusion. 
This is where the counterterrorism strategy of dialogue might end up reconstructing the 
integration strategies so far pursued by the government which have primarily been a one-
way street of Their adjustment to Our ways. 
Inclusion of skeptics and the self-excluded are, however, not a straight forward task. Fur-
thermore these two reasons to dialogue do not warrant a complete switch to strategies of 
uncontrolled dialogue.  
First, the fact that it is necessary for the government writers to name one of the specific 
sub-strategies ‘disagreeing dialogue’ (2008:34) underlines the need to pay attention to the 
way the word ‘dialogue’ is utilized in Danish political discourse on integration and coun-
terterrorism.13 Hence, the following sections zoom in on dialogue as monologue (section 
0); dialogue as inclusion (section 6); and finally dialogue as interchange in need of coun-
terparts (section 7).  
Second, even though a strategy of dialogue opens a wider space for the other whom one 
is engaging than does a strategy of partnership, there are still limits that need to be con-
trolled. This need to monitor the other engaged in dialogue is the focus for section 8 
which – via section 9 on dialogue as confrontation and dialogue as an appendix to self-
engagement describing the background for the need to monitor – leads to the concluding 
section on the strategic position of non-radicalized Muslims. 
 
5. Dialogue as Monologue; Deferring Dialogue 
The etymology of the word ‘dialogue’ – originating in Greek διά (‘across/inter-‘) and 
λόγος (‘speech’) – suggests that it denotes an inter-action across two or more distinct en-
tities.14 In Danish discourse on integration, the word ‘dialogue’ is, however, most fre-
quently used to denote a one-way process of one entity acting on another.15 
First of all, in the government action plan on prevention of radicalization the word ‘dia-
logue’ is often accompanied by ‘enlightenment’16 (2008:34, 35, 37) – and even if a head-
line says ‘dialogue’, the content of the strategy might be ‘enlightenment’. One example is 
the description of the Arab Initiative which includes myth busting, ‘a precise and nuanced 
educational [oplysnings-; litterally: enligthenment] effort’, ‘public diplomacy initiatives 
on Danish foreign policy’, ‘challenging and countering the unequivocal and negative 
presentation of Danish foreign policy engagement’, ‘information sessions’, ‘information 
                                                 
13 In parallel, the need to stress the element of mutuality in ‘Mutual integration in the civil society associa-
tions [foreningslivet]’ (2008:14, 41; italics added) highlights how ‘integration’ in Danish discourse equals 
Their assimilation to Our ways. The specific initiatives listed under this heading does – irrespective of the 
heading – only include measures to equip Them to engage in Our unmodified organizational forms. 
14 The Online Etymology Dictionary warns that ‘Mistaken belief that it can only mean ‘conversation be-
tween two persons’ is from confusion of dia- and di-.’, i.e. ‘across’ and ‘two-http://www. etymonline.com/ 
index.php?term=dialogue, cf. http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/dialogue, both accessed 29 September 2008). 
15 Lindekilde conceptualizes two logics of dialogue and deliberation observed in Danish debates during the 
Cartoon affair as ‘monological’ and ‘multilogical’; both often termed ‘dialogue’ (2007:4f; 20). 
16 Literally ‘oplysning’, which may also – less drastically – be translated ‘informing/information’. 
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materials’; all one-way measures summarized as ‘dialogue and enlightenment’ (2008:35). 
In these cases the ‘dialogue’ is really a monologue. 
A strategy of one-way information is frequently accompanied by an analysis of the distri-
bution of knowledge claiming that We have the truth and They are plain wrong:  
The cartoon affair has ... shown ... that Arab populations have a scanty [alt for ringe] knowledge 
of our society and not the least of our great effort and engagement in the region. (MP Poulsen, 
lib., F45, 2006.05.24 16:45) 
Misinformation, propaganda, misunderstandings and problems of communication constitutes im-
portant parts of the complex of problems of which extremist opinions are also a part. ... A com-
prehensive plan will be drawn up for information and communication on the government’s and 
other authorities policies and efforts in areas like integration, the conditions for religious commu-
nities, Denmark’s engagement in the outside world, etc.. ... It is ... a key challenge that normal 
channels of information does not necessarily reach the young people whom one as a public au-
thority wants to engage in dialogue. (2008:57; cf. Nyidanmark 2008(2):13) 
Second, a series of educational measures are listed which aim at securing that grown ups 
as well as primary school children (in public and especially private – i.e. Muslim – 
schools) acquire the ‘societal goals and values’ (2008:43) and ‘the ability to see a ques-
tion from all sides and the knowledge of democratic dialogue and argumentation.’ 
(2008:45f). In these cases there might be a two-way dialogue somewhere in the horizon – 
but the immediate strategy remains monological. Or in the words of a critic in parliament: 
‘All in all, one must say that the initiative so far has been marked by a rather didactic at-
mosphere’ (MP Lund, UL, F45, 17:45). 
A third variation implies dialogue to be simultaneously a central part of both a) the goal 
of enlightenment and b) the means to achieving that goal:  
The purpose [of the Arab initiative] was to establish a basis for a broader dialogue with the coun-
tries of the Middle East and Northern Africa and, hence, contribute support to the development of 
democratic and economic reforms ... [T]he initiative shall focus far more on support to the forces 
who want to develop free media, free communication, spreading of information [oplysning; liter-
ally: enlightenment] and knowledge. An enlightened population has a better possibility for inde-
pendently making up its mind and thereby for choosing. Knowledge is power – and therefore ac-
cess to knowledge is for the Arab populations the master key to choosing democracy and dialogue 
rather than dictatorship and violence. (MP Christmas-Møller, con., F45, 17:30; underlining 
added) 
In other words; we may – by means of engaging Them in dialogue – support Their way 
towards a stage of development where They are able to choose dialogue as a preferred 
means of interaction. If this stage is reached, the other is ready for inclusion in two-way 
interchange.  
The effectual deferral of inclusion in two-way interchange is what unites concepts of dia-
logues-as-monologue: Now you listen and do as We say – later you might be ready speak 
in a way that is worth listening to. The message of dialogue-as-monologue does not play 
very well with strategies of dialogue-as-inclusion and dialogue-as-interchange; the focus 
for the following two sections. 
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6. Dialogue as Inclusion; Precarious Invitations 
Inclusion of non-radicalized Muslims in partnerships and in society in general is central 
to the Danish government’s strategies for countering terrorism. To have someone accept 
invitations to be included, however, it is seen as decisive that they do not feel patronized. 
The domestically focused government action plan to counter terrorism proposes the es-
tablishment of a ‘Dialogue forum against militant extremism’ Ibid., 2008:34; italics 
added) – that is, it invites partners who are free to engage in a partnership with an obliga-
tion to the predetermined goal defined by the partnership:  
The aim of the effort is ... to promote the understanding of the partners in dialogue that countering 
violent radicalization is a common interest and a common responsibility. (2008:34-5)  
But securing the inclusion of someone who is currently reacting to perceived exclusion 
by further self-exclusion is not easy: A central argument for basing community centres 
[medborgercentre; literally: co-citizen centers] in public libraries is that  
they are physically located locally where the young are, and ... they are offered openly without 
presenting themselves as a social service or inferring with the dignity of the receiver. (2008:37) 
In parallel,  
The police needs to an even higher degree than today to focus on understanding culture [kultur-
forståelse] [to facilitate t]he police’s dialogue with young people – not least young Danes with a 
pluricultural background - [which] is of essential significance for a respectful and trustful relation 
(2008:39) 
So authorities need to downplay authority and upgrade understanding and respect to in-
vite for inclusion. Similarly, the strategy of including Middle Eastern Muslims is precari-
ous:  
Concerning the work in the Muslim world it is especially important that the effort is not perceived 
as ‘cultural imperialism’ and that it does not get an aura [et skær] of religious missionary work. 
The renewal must be done in respect for local values and in a way supported by the affected popu-
lations. Only in that way is there a prospect for its success. (2003:16). 
Hence, Denmark does not insist on neither the point of departure, the point of arrival, nor 
the route in between – only the general direction and overall intention needs to be right: 
There is no single recipe for democratic development... The starting points as well as the out-
comes of every process of development will always be those of each of the nations involved. 
(2005:4) 
In sum, we need in a non-authoritative and non-coercive way to invite partners to freely 
engage – as far, as much, and as deep, as they want to – in their own obligation to the 
project to liberate themselves. 
But how is the invitation to inclusion of difference envisaged without authority and coer-
cion? First, domestically there is a need for an instant performance of the inclusion of dif-
ference; a celebration which in itself performs the inclusion: 
To strengthen the community in general there is ... a general need for an increased recognition of 
the plurality which the Danish population is today marked by. In the light of this ... a highly visible 
campaign is launched to celebrate the Danish population, its plurality and its common and mutual 
responsibility for a good society with possibilities for all and respect for the individual human be-
ing. (2008:36). 
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But second, more important are the long time performative mechanism of individuals 
‘experiencing’ being ‘part of the community’ and, hence, ‘obtaining democratic compe-
tencies’ through ‘practical participation in different forms of dialogue and decision mak-
ing processes’ (2008:40) – through civil society clubs and associations, through student’s 
councils (2008:40f), through participatory urban renewal projects (2008:48f), and even 
through ‘practical training in participatory democracy [nærdemokrati] in the prisons’ 
(2008:51). 
Similarly in the international efforts, the very process of dialogue itself is seen as a 
mechanism of inclusion; not only inclusion in a practical community of interaction but 
also inclusion in the set of values which is to frame the partnership:  
The government’s overall goal ... is to support reforms and progress in the Arab countries ... and 
promote political dialogue between parties in these countries and Denmark. These two objectives 
are seen as two sides of the same coin. ... This implies that the vast majority of activities under the 
programme will be developed and carried out in partnerships between Danish and Arab organisa-
tions [... since] partnerships between Danish organizations and institutions ... and their Arab 
counterparts ... leads to natural dialogue on questions of reform (2005:7, 9)17 
So the word ‘dialogue’ may mean an invitation to inclusion through experiencing partici-
pation; an invitation which it is a delicate task to formulate, since it needs to downplay 
the very hierarchical relation involved in Our supplying the goal, terms and resources for 
the relationship. 
However, as the quote above continues; The Arab Initiative includes a different kind of 
projects as well: 
[D]ialogue projects proper are to diminish clashes of opinion18 and create contacts across divi-
sions which would not necessarily have been crossed otherwise. (2005:9) 
This ‘dialogue proper’ involves two-way interchange between different entities. Dialogue 
as a two-way interchange implies Our need to listen to what the other say, even if it was 
originally intended that we should do the talking. This concept of dialogue is the focus 
for the next section. 
 
7. Dialogue as Interchange; the Need to Listen to have Counterparts 
In the evaluation of the Arab Initiative, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes ‘the 
proper intention of dialogue [as]: mutual exchange of experience and broadened horizons 
on both sides’ (2006:10; italics added) – e.g. a two-way interchange between different 
entities. This definition occurs, however, only in passing as a justification for the unfore-
seen need for self-development on the part of the Danish NGOs as part of the process of 
establishing partnerships:  
[M]any of the Danish organizations have had to learn and conclude their own experiences [drage 
deres egne erfaringer] during the cooperation with the Arab partner. (2006:10).  
                                                 
17 Two specific examples are ‘exchange of students, research cooperation, exchange of curricula, etc.’ be-
tween universities and ‘co-production and exchange between journalists’ (2006:23). 
18 The Danish text has ‘bryde meningsmodsætninger [literally: break contrasts of opinion]’ which could 
imply a strategy of inclusion rather than one of interchange. 
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The MFA in parallel recollects from a survey of Middle Eastern perceptions of Denmark 
in the aftermath of the Cartoon affairs an  
expressed wish for a dialogue in which there is a true reciprocity ... in which both parties as a point 
of departure recognize the existence of differences and show a will also to relate to the problems 
of ones own society. (2006:13).  
These examples testify to the force of the very word ‘dialogue’: If you invite some other 
to a dialogue, you run the risk that they demand it to be a two-way interaction. And if you 
engage in a two-way interaction by not only speaking but also listening, you might meet 
demands for your self-reform – even if the aim of your invitation was the reform of the 
other.19 
In domestic policies of integration, the need to listen as part of a strategy of dialogue is, 
i.a., negotiated through the handling of alleged discrimination against immigrants and 
ethnic minorities. A report from a government think tank on integration is instructive in 
how charges of discrimination are constructed as not worth listening to: First, ‘actual dis-
crimination’ is next to impossible to measure – and while ‘perceived discrimination’ 
may, secondly, be an actual ‘barrier against important aspects of integration’ this per-
ceived discrimination is, however, ‘subjective’ and, hence, ‘reservations need to be 
made’ to reports of it (Ministeriet for Integration m.v. 2006: sections 1.4, 6.1, 6.4; italics 
added). 
In the early days after the present liberal/conservative government came into office, the 
worry that discrimination might hinder labor market integration was indeed primary to 
the Minister of Employment: 
we have difficulties listening to people who do not speak proper Danish, i.e. standard Danish... 
We are not tolerant towards anything else than fluent Danish. ... We have to consider if our habit-
ual thinking [on what constitutes proper Danish] stands in the way for getting a share of the new-
Danish manpower. (Beskæftigelsesministeren 2002) 
From the 7/7 London bombings and the 2006 Cartoon affair on, however, the worry of 
discrimination and the need to listen took second place in policies of integration. A 
statement from early 2008 is exemplary: perceived discrimination does constitute a prob-
lem but the main mistake to be corrected is that the majority community has not been de-
cisive in demanding cultural assimilation of minorities: 
Out of misguided kindness we have for years wrapped the immigrants up in cotton wool. We have 
called it cultural differences and let things slide while imagining Denmark as a multicultural soci-
ety. ...[Y]oung people of different ethnic background do experience discrimination. ... It is no use. 
Integration is a common responsibility and the trades and businesses do have part of the respon-
sibility. ... [But] a lot of the integration problems are about people who have moved to Denmark 
but do not engage in society. It might be about linguistic barriers but it is also about having – and 
not the least about sticking to – different values and norms. ... [C]ulture and religion may curb the 
daily well-being and development in the workplaces. (Beskæftigelsesministeren 2008) 
                                                 
19 This convoluted sentence could be taken to draw the same conclusion: ‘[I]mmigrants and descendants 
from the Middle East and Northern Africa living in Denmark [will t]hrough their cultural and social roots 
in the region potentially be able to ... put the program in perspective in relation to the domestic Danish de-
bate on meetings of culture and multiethnicity.’ (2006:28). Read like this, the message would be that Mus-
lim migrants as part of the Arab initiative might be able to influence the domestic Danish debate. It could, 
however, also be read to say that Muslim migrants as part of the Arab initiative might be able to influence 
the perception in the Middle East of the domestic Danish debate. 
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A few months later, however, the action plan to counter radicalization has as a central 
point that it is 
important to strengthen the efforts to counter discrimination – and to a higher degree also concen-
trate the efforts towards neutralizing the diffuse sense of discrimination apparently felt by some 
young people. (2008:32)  
The inclusion of the word ‘apparently’ in the sentence derives the listening part of this 
strategy of dialogue-as-interaction of some of its thrust: ‘We hear that you claim to per-
ceive to be discriminated. We acknowledge that this perception is a problem. But we 
don’t really believe that the perception is correct.’ So the immediate solution to this prob-
lem remains a one-way strategy: ‘It is necessary to communicate in a more clear way 
what is done and what possibilities the young people have.’ (2008:32). The very need to 
counter not only (hard to measure) ‘actual’ discrimination but also (subjective) ‘per-
ceived’ discrimination constitutes, however, an openness to listening as part of dialogue. 
And more generally the action plan on counter radicalization explicitly embraces a strat-
egy of two-way dialogue between differing partners:  
To a certain extent efforts should be concentrated on ‘disagreeing dialogue’ – that is direct dia-
logue with persons who represent controversial opinions but are able to influence the opinions of 
the young ones in a peaceful and responsible direction. (2008:34).  
But over what are we disagreeing? What kind of difference is it that we have in relation 
to this other; this other which We are inviting to a two-way dialogue? It is clear, that the 
difference of the counterpart – which is to be upheld – pertains to culture and religion: 
Let us recognize that there is difference between our cultures and let us not believe that we have to 
remake [lave om på] each others. Muslims shall not be Christians and Christians shall not be 
Muslims. (MFA Møller, con., F45, 18:15). 
A substantial difference of culture and religion is needed to constitute a relevant counter-
part in dialogue – but it is not enough. Neither is the overall commitment to non-violent 
means in itself enough. For dialogue to be meaningful, this religio-culturally different yet 
non-violent counterpart needs to be ‘able to influence’ – and if it is not by itself able, we 
need to empower it: ‘the effort need to build on partnerships, competence building and 
strengthening the moderate and constructive forces.’ (2008:53). And if the counterpart is 
not present, we shall constitute it: 
Even if many young people with a pluricultural background are active in the democracy there is 
unfortunately a large group who does not avail itself of it or sees its possibilities. A special de-
mocratic platform focusing on plurality is therefore established. The platform is expected to take 
the form of a network consisting mainly of young people with pluricultural background, represen-
tatives from select organizations in voluntary civil society organizations [det frivillige foren-
ingsliv] and the world of eduation (2008:42). 
Among the functions of this network is that it should work as a  
Mouthpiece for young people with pluricultural background in questions of current interest, in-
cluding advice to ministries, organizations etc. (2008:42) 20 
                                                 
20 This way of constituting counterparts is a well known strategy for the corporatist Danish state. Examples 
include the state initiation of the Danish Consumer Council in 1947 prompted by a need for the state to 
have an interest based organization to counterweigh commercial and agricultural interests. 
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Existing groups too may enter into partnerships to enjoy both the status as a partner in 
dialogue and material support: 
The government ... will strengthen the dialogue with the Muslim religious communities about how 
extremism may be countered. Through a partnership – involving among other things advising, or-
ganizational and possibly economic support – work may be done to support those Muslim groups 
who want to contribute an effort against extremism and abuse of their religion. (2008:59). 
There is, however, no such thing as a free lunch. The status and material support come at 
a price: 
Danish Muslims shall be helped to develop a codex to secure that extremist forces do not utilize 
mosques and Islamic culture centers to spread undemocratic opinions and to recruit members. ... 
[M]ain priorities are that the abilities and competences of the imams shall be further developed; 
that mosques shall be centers which promote cohesive power, citizenship and dialogue; that there 
shall be responsibility and transparency; and that added access to mosques shall be given to 
women and youth. (2008:59).  
To sum up: As one of the strategies to counter terrorism, the government proposes to en-
gage non-radicalized Muslims in dialogue. As the other engages – or fails to engage – in 
dialogue, the government makes explicit a concept of dialogue as a two-way process; i.e. 
a process including listening on Our part. The government even wants to engage in 
‘building’ counterparts for this dialogue. The difference of the counterparts relevant to 
engage in two-way dialogue, however, needs to stays within certain limits. These limits 
to the difference of the other engaging in dialogue – and the need to monitor the limits – 
are the focus for the next section. 
 
8. Staying in control – the Need to Monitor the Limits of Dialogue 
Inviting an other into a dialogue understood as monologue is relatively harmless; the 
worst thing that may happen is that the other does not listen and does not reform him-
self.21 Inviting an other into a dialogue understood as inclusion or as a two-way interac-
tion involves stakes that are immediately higher since you have awarded the other a plat-
form to speak from: You have legitimized the interventions of the other in advance. So 
faced with a two-way dialogue a need arises to limit the agenda which is to be engaged 
by the other invited; limit the difference of the other invited; and monitor that the other 
stays within the limits of difference. Only then do you have a chance of staying in control 
of the dialogue. 
Concerning the agenda of the dialogue, the pitfalls are many. One is that  
cross-religious dialogue efforts specifically focusing on contrasts and different sets of values may 
contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy. ... The strategy of the Arab Initiative has been to avoid 
these ‘across the cleavage [over kløften]’ dialogues (2006:16). 
                                                 
21 Such a resistance against a one-way remaking of another might in itself constitute a problem for the re-
maker: since it challenges the value of the direction of remaking; ie. the universality of the values of the 
Self (cf. Rumelili 2004; 2007). This lack of recognition of the self might spur re-conceptualization of the 
crucial elements of the self-conception (Gad 2008c) – or it might provoke a regression to a strategy of 
elimination. 
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Since the overall aim of the dialogue is to avoid radicalization by facilitating co-operation 
or even inclusion there is no need to dig the trenches deeper by discussing the founda-
tional difference.  
Another pitfall is that the Other might ask you to re-make yourself. While the plan of ac-
tion suggests establishing a ‘contact unity for dialogue between the authorities and reli-
gious communities’ the dialogue is in the same very move limited to focus on ‘the scope 
of the activities of these [communities]’ (2008:38).22 We will have a dialogue – but there 
is only one point on the agenda: ‘You’. 
Controlling the agenda of dialogue by explicitly listing it in advance is one way of stay-
ing in control. Another – and probably more efficient – way is to limit who is invited to 
join the dialogue. This is repeatedly done in highly abstract terms invoking a heavy load 
of liberal, Western political philosophy. The action plan to counter radicalization says 
i.a.:  
Our common endorsement of the fundamental values of the society – freedom, equality, and mu-
tual responsibility for all – is ... a precondition for our differences [forskelligheder] to be able to 
thrive in a good way. (2008:12). 
The Arab initiative delineates its invitation in words of similar origin: 
Dialogue must build on mutual respect. Cultural and religious differences must be recognized 
within the framework of the universal human rights. Religious and cultural values and traditions 
may never serve as an excuse for depriving the individual human being of its freedom or rights. 
Where extremism in one way or another is placing itself in the way of democracy and respect for 
human rights, Denmark shall actively support the forces working for tolerance and respect for the 
individual human being (2003:14) 
The way ‘mutual respect’ is added to the delimiting criteria makes it impossible to de-
cide, if the mutual respect is criterion in parallel with the ‘framework of universal rights’ 
– or if the human rights are a threshold to pass on the way to mutual respect. 
Compared to the principled statements of government text, in parliamentary debates, the 
limits are tightened. In the words of the speaker for the liberal government party: 
the initiative is [to be] concentrated on the cooperative [samarbejdsvillige] countries and gov-
ernments ... We have to demand democratization and will to reform (MP Poulsen, lib, F45, 
16:45). 
After parliamentary oversight, the invitation is only extended to the ones who have a 
track record of reforming themselves – not just to those who declare their adherence to a 
list of entrance criteria. 
Even so, Denmark may suggest less-than-radical Others with whom we are in a dialogue 
to lower their threshold for inclusion of close-to-radical Others more than Denmark is 
willing to accept when dealing with others abroad: 
Islamist movements, often constituting a strong, popular opposition, in many countries include 
moderate Islamist organizations working for political liberalization ... By not recognizing these 
organizations and by not seeking to include them in the political process one might contribute to 
                                                 
22 So, as a comment to the plan of action submitted to the Ministry suggests ‘The description of assign-
ments [of the contact unity] concerns to a higher degree ... information rather than ... dialogue proper’ (In-
stitut for Menneskerettigheder 2008:6). 
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pushing them towards the embrace of radical circles. ... Denmark ... speaks for the inclusion in the 
political process of all political actors and groupings, on the condition, of course, that they work 
on a peaceful and democratic platform. (2006:27).23 
Wherever exactly the limit for acceptable difference is drawn, the limit needs – as this 
concerns Others potentially radical, i.e. potential existential threats to our identity – to be 
policed. In the action plan to counter radicalization, the government allots some attention 
to this question of controlling the counterparts in dialogue – both in relation to the Mus-
lim Danes in general (the majority of whom are ‘decisive allies’ (prime minister A.F. 
Rasmussen, lib., F7, 2005.11.16, 15:20) in the fight against terrorism), and in relation to 
the specific partners for specific dialogues. 
In relation to young people the well established local cooperation on crime prevention 
involving schools, social services, and police should ‘raise attention to signs of radicali-
zation ... to improve the possibilities for implementing preventive measures’ (2008:30) 
including ‘individual preventive talks ... between intelligence officers and persons from 
extremist groupings’ (2008:30) to signal that we know who you are, but also the ‘devel-
opment of a mentor corps’ equipped to ‘tackle identity related problems through conver-
sation and guidance’ (2008:31). Furthermore,  
a network of school directors on democracy training and problems concerning extremism ... may 
... be used as an active tool, so swift reaction may be taken if radical activities should blaze up 
(2008:44). 
And waiting for the problems to make themselves visible will not do; spot tests will be 
made:  
The Ministry of Education begins a dialogue with the associations of private primary schools 
about carrying out a series of inspections of 25 selected private primary schools with a view to 
evaluate whether the schools are in accordance with the demand for them to prepare the pupils 
for living in a society with freedom and popular rule. (2008:44).  
The task of policing the limit of acceptable difference, however, is not an easy one as it 
concerns slight differences on the part of the other hard to tell for Us as outsiders: 
to distinguish between radicalization and ordinary religious interest is difficult. ... To judge 
whether it is a case of violent radicalization or just political or religious interest demand such a 
highly specialized knowledge that it will be impossible for the individual [crime-prevention] 
worker to distinguish. (Nyidanmark 2008(2):11) 
As the difference is hard to tell, the partners in partnerships and counterparts in dialogue 
need to make themselves transparent for monitoring. In general,  
Well organized religious communities, characterized by transparency and good leadership ... may 
contribute positively to the Danish society. (2008:38; underlining added). 
The closer, the target group is to radicalization, the closer monitoring is needed of the 
less-than-radical other we need as a partner or counterpart in dialogue: 
                                                 
23 These ‘double standards’ are criticized by an opposition speaker: ‘Hamas has been elected by a majority 
in the Palestinian population. Hamas is definitively not my cup of tea; Hamas is a religious, fundamentalist 
movement which I cannot in any way support. But I can, however, support that the Palestinians have 
elected Hamas, and therefore I do not think that one should, for instance, cut the support for the Home 
Rule.’ (MP Lund, UL, F45, 17:55). 
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[A]ppointing more imams [to work in prisons] ... may contribute to countering radicalization of 
Muslim inmates. Imams working in prisons shall pass a thorough process of approval to secure 
that they have the necessary abilities in Danish language, knowledge about the Prison Service and 
insight in Danish societal conditions. Furthermore the imam’s opinion on the Prison Service need 
to be evaluated and in each case a security assessment shall be made. Clerical actions and ser-
mons shall take place in Danish [a list of exceptions omitted -/upg]... It must be possible for the 
prison officers to follow every clerical action and if necessary record them, e.g. with a view to 
translation. (2008:52). 
By institutionalizing a set of procedures for policing and monitoring the limits of accept-
able difference it is clear that the position of the Muslim less-than-radical Other engaged 
in dialogue is not really a de-securitized position. The terrorist radical Other is an overtly 
securitized figure. Concerning the less-than-radical Muslim Other, the securitization is 
institutionalized in procedures of policing and monitoring as a necessary supplement to 
the strategies of inclusion and dialogue. The next section lays out how this re-
securitization is necessary for the government to make to articulate, on the one hand, the 
necessity of securing identity with, on the other hand, the possibility of dialogue with an 
other potentially asking you to change.  
 
9. Dialogue as Clash; Dialogue as Appendix to Self-Engagement 
The government articulates strategies of two-way dialogue – only to supplement them 
with measures to police and monitor the limits of the difference to be allowed in dia-
logue. This articulation in part of the governments positioning of itself as the defenders of 
Danish identity by reforming the other – between an opposition promoting self-reform 
and a right wing party doubting the possibility of reforming the other. 
The policing and monitoring comes explicitly as an answer to the right wing Danish Peo-
ple’s Party, on which the government relies for its parliamentary majority: 
[C]oncerning the immigrants who are to participate and co-operate in this project [the Arab Ini-
tiative]: How do we secure that the people we are cooperating with – who have a connection to 
the Middle East and who live in Denmark and who might even be Danish citizens – are not identi-
cal with the imams who to a very high degree tore it for [ødelagde det for] Denmark [during the 
Cartoon Crisis]? (MP Espersen, DPP, F45, 18.25). 
The DPP repeatedly questions if Muslims are at all capable of reform and inclusion, of 
democracy: 24 
even if Denmark is the victim of the [Cartoon] conflict and the Arab world is the perpetrator it is 
us who kindly hold out our hand as an invitation to reconciliation and dialogue and we even pay 
for it. ... [I]t is likeable [sympatisk] that we in the democracies ... stubbornly against all odds in-
sist [holde fast ved] that even in the Arab countries there must be a possibility for popular rule 
and development. ... [T]he DPP accepts the continuation of the Arab initiative ... not the least be-
cause the government has intimated to us that ... the initiative is simultaneously of great signifi-
cance for the security of Denmark. It is ... to the benefit of Denmark, that as many countries as 
possible become democratic countries. (MP Espersen, DPP, F45, 17:10; cf. MP Langballe, DPP, 
in Pedersen 2006).  
                                                 
24 Aggressive confrontation with Islamism is not the monopoly of Danish People’s Party. MP Naser 
Khader, who is currently re-branding his centrist splinter party as fundamentalist liberalists, recently sup-
plied the headline ‘Dialogue? Stuff it! [Rend mig i dialogen]’ to an interview on how to relate to Islamism, 
radical or not (Khader in Johnsen 2008). 
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To support that dialogue aimed at reforming the Muslim world is a responsible counter-
terrorism strategy, the government works to redraw this image of a Western civilization 
clashing with a Muslim one into a clash between civilization (in the West and in the Mus-
lim world) on the one side and fundamentalism on the other side:  
The clash of civilizations which many fear will destroy a calm development of the world in the fu-
ture is taking place right now within the Muslim civilizations where fundamentalists will damage 
the many good forces in the Arab world who – like us – seek stability, security, and progress and 
who see it as decisive to have the countries opened up politically and economically and thereby 
contribute to weakening Islamism and stopping the terrorism destroying their everyday life. (MFA 
Møller, con., F45, 16:30; cf. MP Kofod,,soc.dem, 17:05; underlining added). 
But this redrawn clash is taken by the opposition as an invitation to venture into an ex-
trapolation so that the DPP is excluded from civilization and relegated to the extremist 
outside: 
[I]f one wants to enter into a dialogue, you may start the dialogue by throwing mud at the others 
and then wonder why it comes to nothing. ... I believe that the Danes to a very high degree are of 
the opinion that they would like to get rid of the fools – that is the ones who have organized them-
selves in Islamic Jihad and Hamas and the like; extremist religious groupings on the one side, and 
the Danish People’s Party constantly contributing such generalizations on the other side. (MP 
Søvndal, soc., F45, 17:15; cf. MP Kofod, soc.dem., F45, 17:15; MP Lund, UL, F45, 17:25) 
This postulated strategy of mutual engagement between civilizational clashers may even 
be a ‘dialogue’ in its own terms: 
The Danish People’s Party and the political Islamists we see in the Middle East are feeding each other 
and feeding on each other and creating a confrontational dialogue from which ordinary people are 
suffering and which is damaging the attempts of other people ... to create dialogue and international 
[mellemfolkelig; litteraly: inter-popular] understanding. (MP Lund, UL, F45, 17:55) 
So to the opposition parties, the alternative is between, on the one hand, ‘confrontational 
dialogue’ and, on the other hand, ‘dialogue and understanding’. But in this alternative, 
the dialogue becomes an appendix to understanding – and the substance of understanding 
is already established. The questions to be asked of the other in dialogue are largely rhe-
torical:  
The question is if Denmark today has at all the moral authority necessary to make a useful effort 
in this field. (MP Lund, UL, F45, 17:45). 
Equally, the answer of the other to come out of the dialogue is known before any dia-
logue is initiated: 
Denmark has come out [of the Cartoon affair] with a reputation which makes it more difficult to 
promote some of the things related to democracy (MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 17:40)  
And so it must be, if the conclusion – that We need to engage in Self-reform – is known 
from the beginning: 
These solutions require corrections to our foreign policy; to our foreign policy alliances, and to 
our development aid, etc. They require real integration with real, equal opportunities when it 
comes to education, jobs, and housing, and hence real and robust prospects for the future on 
equal footing. (Baastrup, F7, 18:10-15; cf. MP Søvndal, soc., F45, 17:35). 
We may only hope to influence the other to reform himself if we do forego with an ex-
ample to follow: 
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If our message of democratization and respect for human rights are to have any effect it is neces-
sary that we ourselves live up to those standards – and unfortunately Denmark does not. (MP 
Lund, F45, 2006.05.24, 17:45; cf. MP Helveg Pedersen, soc.lib., F45, 2006.05.24, 18:00) 25 
So in this strategy promoted by the parliamentarian opposition, dialogue basically 
amounts to an appendix to Self-engagement. This form of dialogue as an anticipated post-
scriptum to self-reform does, however, uphold the structural opening to the other. Even 
though we have initially not waited to actually listen – if the partner in dialogue actually 
says something it will be difficult to decline listening. We are advocating change legiti-
mated by Their supposed grievances – so it will be hard to ignore, should They intervene. 
Contrarily, if you see yourself to embody qualities which are to be protected against 
change, any opening to others will only compromise your identity. Even if the other, 
whom we engage in dialogue is not the radical other; if the less-than-radical other repro-
duces the demands of the radical other, the result remains the same: 
 [T]he terror has won if [we] are not willing to do what needs to be done when terrorism and the 
terror networks demand. Is [the honored member] really willing to give in to terrorism and let the 
threat of terror mean that one decline from doing something (Poulsen, AD14, 12:40; cf.Langballe, 
US108; Møller, US108; Langballe, F7, 17:40-45; MP Espersen, DPP, F7, 19:10)26 
In this situation, dialogue must be an appendix to a different form of self-engagement; 
not to self-reform but to self-fortification:  
We do ... not want a multicultural Denmark. We find that Danish Christianity, history, culture and 
conception of democracy shall be the foundation upon which Denmark rests. We need to be better 
at dialogue ... and in that dialogue we shall dare to say who we are. The presence of people of an-
other ethnic background and a different religious faith shall not make us give up what is ours 
[vort eget]. (Hornbech, lib., F18, 2000.11.23) 
 
A Bakhtinian inner dialogue – potentially placing identity in jeopardy – needs to be 
averted; the price is that an external dialogue with the other is too dangerous since it 
might spur doubts on the integrity of identity. 
                                                 
25 The MFA, on the basis of surveys in Jordan and Egypt, concedes that ‘the impression of Denmark has 
changed as a result of the [Cartoon] affair. From giving relatively positive associations to a liberal and open 
minded [frisindet] welfare society, Denmark is today closely associated with the ‘West’ under the leader-
ship of the USA which is typically perceived to be cynical and of moral double standards.’ (Udenrigsminis-
teriet 2006:13). The MFA notes as a ‘positive element’ that the respondents ‘to a great extent distinguish 
between Denmark and the Danes.’ (2006:13) implying that only the image of the state and not that of the 
people has been damaged. The MFA’s conclusion to this problem is, however, not to chose a strategy of 
dialogue but one of enlightenment: ‘It will take a sustained effort to reestablish a positive image of Den-
mark with a point of departure in the real [sic] Denmark as a peaceful, Scandinavian country.’ (Uden-
rigsministeriet 2006:14). The recommendation highlighted in the executive summary is ‘To make an in-
creased public diplomacy effort to communicate motives and values for the Danish engagement in the 
Middle East and to present the Arab Initiative as a part of a comprehensive Danish foreign policy for the 
Middle East which to an equal degree prioritizes the security political and socio-economic aspects.’ (Uden-
rigsministeriet 2006:3) – even if the final conclusion to the analysis is that ‘living in strict accordance with 
our own principles will probably be the most efficient lever for the recovery of the trust and credibility in 
the cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries.’ (2006:27). 
26 In this quote not only this or that quality of the Self is put into question; the very capability of agency is 
at stake: If we listen to possible demands of an other and retract from this course of action, we will have 
lost the capacity to act altogether – since the same demand is also one of the demands of the radical other. 
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As the government is not inclined to put its preferred strategies of elimination, control 
and emancipation in question, it needs to control the limits of what input may come out 
of the supplementary strategy of dialogue. And dialogue is in parliamentary negotiations 
reduced to a rhetorical appendix to self-engagement either in the form of an anticipated 
post-scriptum legitimizing self-reform or as an occasion for self-fortification.  
 
10. Conclusion 
Since 9/11, the Danish government has pursued strategies of elimination and control to 
counter terrorism – supplemented, increasingly after 7/7 and the Cartoon affairs by 
strategies of reform and liberation. The strategies of liberation have involved strategies of 
partnership and dialogue – recently increasingly dialogue understood as a two-way inter-
change between different and differing entities. Domestic policies of integration have 
taken its point of departure in the perceived religio-cultural homogeneity of Denmark. 
Cultural diversity represented by Muslim migrants has been pointed out as a threat to this 
central element of Danish identity discourse. In this context of integration seen as one-
way assimilation, a turn to dialogue could be significant. 
Let us, however, turn the tables and see how the strategies of dialogue look from the per-
spective of the less-than-radical other: Muslims in the Middle East and in Denmark are 
invited to engage in a dialogue with the Danish state. Most of them will probably agree to 
the aim: To avert terrorism.  
As you read through the invitation you have just received, you find that the agenda of the 
dialogue is long and detailed; that a number of the specific points of the agenda involves 
monologues recited by the invitor; that you are supposed to perform in specified ways 
before and after arriving at the table; and that a series of measures will be taken to moni-
tor your behaviour and utterances. You also notice that you are only invited because you 
are perceived to be well-connected to or at least in command of special skills allowing 
you to communicate with potential terrorists, whom you probably agree are bad guys. Or 
maybe you are invited because you are seen as a potential terrorist yourself...  
Would you accept the invitation? Many probably would not (cf. Mach 2006:4) and there 
is a danger that the framing of the invitation might turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy by 
pushing a few of the, hence, potentially-radicalized others in the wrong direction (Danish 
Institute for International Studies 2008:2). So in that sense, the net effect of the initiative 
could turn out to be negative. 
Should you accept the invitation? Yes. As Judith Butler notes; if one is awarded a posi-
tion "at a distance from oneself" (1997:33f) one may react using that position as a plat-
form for speaking back; i.a. by insisting to be included (cf. 1997:91), since "it is clearly 
possible to speak with authority without being authorized to speak" (1997:157). There is 
no other way to resist the delimitation of an identity than to insist on redrawing its limits 
(1997:140). Insist on participating in the dialogue you have been invited to – and insist on 
redrawing the limits put up whenever you find them disturbing. Only in that way may 
you, the potentially radicalized, help secure that the net effect of the initiative is in the 
end positive. 
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